Thursday, January 4, 2018

Beamer slides for Hendel & Nevo's "Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory Behavior"

I took an empirical industrial organization course taught by Andrea Szab√≥ spring semester of 2017. Andrea had a great layout for the course that made a potentially dense subject area more approachable than it would have been otherwise.

I developed beamer slides for Igor Hendel and Aviv Nevo's 2006 Econometrica paper. I thought I would share them here in case anyone found them useful.

I also wrote up a report implementing Berry (1994)'s discrete choice logit demand estimation and the subsequent random coefficients innovation in Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995) using weekly scanner data. Implementing these discrete choice models solidified my understanding of a number of basic concepts in microeconomics. Consequently, I will follow this post up with a roadmap from Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995) to the Hendel & Nevo (2006) slides. I haven't come across literature that more than summarily describes how concepts build on one another within the discrete choice demand estimation literature, so writing this out as a sort of bridge between masters level microeconomics and empirical organization may be illustrative to me and might be helpful for others in the future.

Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Quel dommage! Broken blogging BibTeX

My BibTeX manager for Blogger isn't working at the moment, so all of the \cite{} commands that I have embedded in my posts are showing up as their actual LaTeX code.

I'm assuming that most people who read my blog are familiar with the literature and can make educated Google searches for the proper reference. If that doesn't work for you, please leave a comment in this post and I'll pull up the proper reference for you until I get everything working again.

The territorial extent of Chinese dynasties 2070 BCE - Present

Saturday, October 28, 2017

Measuring bureaucratic autonomy with natural language processing

Both \cite{Fukuyama2013} and \cite{Borcan2014} provide motivation to control for both the quality of governance between regions and the quality of governance between levels of administration within a region when assessing governance outcomes. For example, \cite{Fukuyama2013} cites widespread knowledge that local governments in China are significantly more corrupt than higher levels of administration. He points out that corruption varies not only by the level of government but by the function of government as well, providing as example by comparison the potential for corruption in a railroad ministry versus the potential held by the central bank. Whereas \cite{Fukuyama2013} provides a literature review that heuristically promotes a measure of state quality based on a nonlinear relationship depending on state capacity's interaction with bureaucratic autonomy, the working paper by \cite{Borcan2014} empirically demonstrate a robust non-linear relationship between state history and current economic development. Though \cite{Borcan2014} can only speculate about the causal relationship that generates the non-linearity, they provide an example of China's history in East Asia that encourages investigating the role that the quality of bureaucracy plays in the nonlinear relationship.

Monday, August 28, 2017

Settlement bias and persistence

I began reading "After the Gold Rush: Tarnished Dreams in the Sacramento Valley" by David Vaught this week. He's got a captivating style of writing, so it's been quick to go through. I highly recommend both this book and "Cultivating California" for anyone interested in historical economics and comparative development.

The beginning of "After the Gold Rush" talks about settlers who took up roots in areas with abundant native vegetation near rivers and streams. Vaught points out that this is a common mistake made my settlers in the history of colonial and early America, and a mistake that was often catastrophic to economic development. Vaught states that abundant native vegetation and wildlife is actually not a good predictor for the suitability of land for agriculture.

Thursday, June 22, 2017

Whistleblowing, inside and out

10/28/2017 Note: I'm reformatting this and will repost the prospectus soon.

12/21/2017 Update: I guess "soon" is pretty relative, isn't it? If whistleblowing interests you, and you haven't read "Whistleblowing" by Michael Ting from the 2008 APSR, the idea is to reflect the employee's initial attempt to blow the whistle internally to the firm and then take the effort outside of the firm. Most whistleblowing attempts start inside a firm, then they move outside when they get ignored. How do the distorted incentives described by Ting stack up with the three-tiered principal agent model played twice, first internally with two managers, and then externally with a manager and an outside regulator?

I haven't had time to get back to this. Email me if this interests you and you have ideas - "johnson" plus the first letter of Thomas and the first letter of Ryan then at gmail.